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The strong complementarity between components of a system makes the competition in
system markets qualitatively different from those in other markets. When there are multiple types
of systems depending on the combinations of the components, there can be several kinds of com-
petition in one system market. The interaction between these competitions and its implication
for the market structure are examined in the first two chapters. Chapter 1 finds that the com-
petition in mixed system markets lessens the competition between the original systems. Chapter
1 also finds that relatively low integration and dissolution costs make the competition between
the original systems less fierce. Chapter 2 finds that the competition in original systems’ retail
markets intensifies the competition between the original systems. As a result of the interactions,
consumer surplus is the lowest and social welfare is the highest when the mixed system markets
are competitive and retail markets are monopolistic.
The last chapter examines how the complementarity between components results in strategic
abandoning of market power in system markets. In industries where components have strong com-
plementarity with each other, competition in one component market directly affects competition
in the other. In this situation, an integrated manufacturer may want to abandon its duopolistic
position in one component market if this leads new entrants to the component market to adopt its
other component, and the loss from giving up the duopolistic position in one component market
is less than the gains from the increased market share of the other component market. Though
both the duopolists may want to choose this strategy, it is also possible that the best response
to the rival’s strategic abandoning of one component market is to keep the duopolistic position
in both component markets. This is because when the duopolists both give up one component
market, market shares for them remain the same as if they kept their duopolistic positions in both
component markets. If the costs for making the retained component compatible with the new
entrants’ components are high, the equilibrium is asymmetric.
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A system consists of a set of components, which together provide utility to consumers.
A computer is a typical example. This characteristic makes the competition in system markets
qualitatively different from those in other markets. When there are multiple types of systems
according to the combinations of the components, there can be several kinds of competition in one
system market. The interaction between these competitions and its implication for the market
structure are examined in the first two chapters. The findings can be an answer to the questions of
why TPCIs exist in system markets and how an upstream manufacturer can benefit from adopting
a monopolistic retailer. Chapter 1 also analyzes how the costs for integrating components into a
system or for breaking a system into components affect the competition in system markets.
Since components of a system have strong complementarity with each other, competition in
one component market directly affects competition in the other. Chapter 3 examines how this com-
plementarity affects the competition in system markets and finds that an integrated manufacturer
may want to abandon its duopolistic position in one component market. This finding can help
us better understand the recent trend in the computer industry towards horizontal competition
model where competition is between component manufacturers. The last chapter also finds that
in certain situations there can be an asymmetric equilibrium where one duopolistic manufacturer




I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Daniel Vincent, for his brilliant and appropriate
advice. I will never forget his passion and lessons during my study. Professor Deborah Minehart
has given me numerous thoughtful comments. I appreciate them very much. I am also grateful
to Professor Peter Cramton for his kind and sharp suggestions. Professors Lawrence Ausubel and
John Horowitz gave me valuable comments though they reviewed my dissertation in the final stage.
I am thankful to them. I would also like to acknowledge Mr. Donald Hirsch’s proofreading and
my best friend Youngsoo Bae’s LaTex and software help. Their support are highly appreciated. I
finally thank my wife, Hyunjoo Lee, and my son, Minjeh Kang, for their help and encouragement.
I dedicate my dissertation to them.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
1 Why “Third-Party Component Integrators” Exist In System Markets 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Competitive TPCIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Locally monopolistic TPCIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.4 Locally monopolistic subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.5 Competitive subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Equilibrium Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 When There Are Intra-firm Trades of Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 Competitive TPCIs or competitive subsidiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Monopolistic TPCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2 Upstream Manufacturers Selling Components and Bundles for System Markets 27
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Competitive Retailers . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Monopolistic Retailers . . . . . . . 33
iv
2.3.3 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Competitive Retailers . . . . . . . 34
2.3.4 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Monopolistic Retailers . . . . . . . 35
2.3.5 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Asymmetric Retailers . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.6 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Asymmetric Retailers . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Equilibrium Downstream Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Strategic Abandoning of Market Power in System Markets 42
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Equilibrium When C Is High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4.1 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Both Manufacturers Sell Incompatible
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4.2 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Only One Manufacturer Sells Compat-
ible Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Both Manufacturers Sell Compatible
Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4.4 Equilibrium of the Whole Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Comparative statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6.1 Equilibrium When C is Very Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.6.2 Equilibrium When C is in Intermediate Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A When All System Prices Are Set Later Than Component Prices 55
A.1 Methods in calculating the equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
v
A.2 Equilibrium prices, profits and welfare when all system prices are set in the last stage 56
B Summary of the Equilibrium in Chapter 2 58
C Numerical Equilibrium Calculation in Cases of Asymmetric Retailers 59
D “Old” and “New” Market Structures in Computer Industry 60




1.1 Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Subgames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare in Each Downstream Market Structure . . . 39
3.1 Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare in Each Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When C Is Not High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B.1 Summary of the Equilibrium in Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Location of Manufacturers and Consumers on the Unit Square . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Demands for the Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Effects of Manufacturer B’s Price Decrease When the Integration Costs Are Zero
and Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 When Manufacturer A Raises the Price for Its Component 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5 Comparison of Consumer Surplus under Each Mixed System Market Structure . . 24
1.6 Comparison of Social Welfare under Each Mixed System Market Structure . . . . . 25
2.1 Locations of the Four Systems and Consumers on the Unit Square . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Demands for the Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Effects of a Decrease in Manufacturer A’s Component 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 Locations of Manufacturers and Consumers on the Unit Square . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Equilibrium Market Configuration When Both Manufacturers Sell Incompatible Sys-
tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3 Equilibrium Market Configuration When Only One Manufacturer Sells Compatible
Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Equilibrium Market Configuration When Both Manufacturers Sell Compatible Soft-
ware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
viii
Chapter 1
Why “Third-Party Component Integrators” Exist In System Markets
1.1 Introduction
We see many third-party component integrators (from now on, TPCIs)1 in system markets2 such as
computers or digital cameras. In computer markets, Dell and Gateway integrate components into
a working system. Some components like CD Rom drives, power cables or monitors are provided
competitively. Components like CPUs are provided by a monopolist. An interesting fact is that
some other components such as RAMs, are provided by system providers, Samsung and Toshiba,
who have market power in the component market. In digital camera markets, CCDs, one of the
most important parts, are made by only a few companies, Sony, Sanyo and Hitachi. Sony and Sanyo
also make and sell their own digital cameras. In camera phone markets, Samsung and Motorola,
who sell their own systems, provide their WCDMA chips and CMOS sensors to other camera
phone makers. One question of this chapter is why these oligopolistic component manufacturers
do not take on the job of integrating and selling the mixed systems. If the manufacturers do the
job, they may benefit from internalizing the competition between their original systems and the
mixed systems utilizing their components.
This chapter attempts to answer that question, using a model of competition between
duopolistic manufacturers of both systems and components. This model is different from the
classical upstream-downstream model in that upstream manufacturers are also competing in the
downstream markets. In this model, the duopolists’ decisions about selling their components
jointly determine the structure of the mixed system markets. Considering its profits under each
1TPCIs are intermediaries that buy components from manufacturers and integrate them to
produce their own systems. In the computer industry, they are often called VARs (Value Added
Retailers).
2A system consists of a set of components, which together provide utility to users. When sold
separately, the components must be integrated in order to produce utility, by consumers themselves
or a third-party integrator, etc.
1
mixed system market structure, each duopolistic manufacturer decides how to sell its components
under no pressure to provide its components competitively.
I find that the duopolistic manufacturers can make more profits when the mixed system
markets are competitive. This result is similar to that in the previous literature on vertical exter-
nalities.3 However, the reason is very different. In the previous literature, an upstream monopolist
prefers a competitive downstream market, because the competitive market does not introduce a
price distortion. If the downstream market is not competitive, then vertical integration of the up-
stream and the downstream firms is profitable. In this model, however, the duopolistic upstream
manufacturers make more profits when the mixed system markets are competitive because com-
petitive mixed system markets bring less fierce competition between the manufacturers’ original
systems. The manufacturers have fewer incentives to lower prices with the competitive mixed sys-
tem markets, resulting in higher prices and profits. For a similar reason, the manufacturers make
more profits under a competitive mixed system market structure than when each manufacturer
has a monopolistic subsidiary for the mixed system market.
An interesting result about consumer surplus comes from this effect of the competition in the
mixed system markets on the competition between the manufacturers’ original systems. Consumer
surplus is lower when the mixed system markets are competitive. This is mainly because the prices
for the manufacturers’ original systems are higher under the competitive mixed system market
structure. However, competitive mixed system markets produce social welfare (joint profits and
consumer surplus) highest and closest to the social planner’s. The intuition behind this result is
that less fierce competition between the manufacturers makes the resulting prices closer to their
socially desirable levels.
Another question of this chapter is about the fact that TPCIs, not consumers themselves,
take the role of integrating components into mixed systems. This chapter attempts to explain
3According to Tirole (1988), a vertical externality arises when any decision made by a down-
stream retailer that increases his/her demand for the intermediate good increases profits for the
upstream manufacturer. Tirole (1988) also gives a brief explanation about the previous literature
about this issue.
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this fact by assuming that it is costly to integrate components into a system and that this kind
of integration costs are less for TPCIs than for consumers. Though the costs can affect firms’
marketing practices and competition among them, the previous literature on system markets has
not considered this issue. For example, Economides defines “compatible components” as being
when “it is feasible for the consumers to integrate them costlessly into a working system.”4 This
chapter examines whether and how the costs for component integration affect manufacturers’
strategies and market outcomes.
Lower integration costs make the competition between the duopolists less fierce, just as the
competitive mixed system markets do. Section 3 presents a detailed explanation of this effect.
As well as the integration costs, dissolution costs5 can also affect the manufacturers’ marketing
and market competition. This is the case when mixed system integrators have opportunity for
arbitrage by purchasing low-priced original systems, breaking them up into components, trading
them with other mixed system integrators, and making mixed systems at lower costs. Section 5
considers the effects of this arbitrage behavior on the manufacturers’ competition.
Section 2 presents the basic model. The equilibrium prices and profits under each mixed
system market structure are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 presents the equilibrium market
structure. Analyses of consumer surplus and social welfare are presented in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
1.2 Model
The basic model is a modified version of the “mix-and-match” model of Matutes and Regibeau
(1988). A system is composed of two components, 1 and 2. Two manufacturers, A and B, are
producing and selling the components and their own systems. Each component is produced at
zero marginal costs, and there are no economies of scope. The components are assumed to be
4Economides (1989), p. 1165.
5Dissolution costs are the costs for breaking up a system into components.
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compatible with the other manufacturer’s matching components.6 Consequently, there are four
possible options for the system: XAA, XBB , XAB , XBA.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit square (see Figure 1.1). Manufacturer A
is located at the origin, while manufacturer B is located at (1,1). Thus, mixed system XAB is
located at (0,1) and XBA at (1,0). A consumer located at the point of coordinates (d1, d2) has an
ideal component 1 that is d1 away from manufacturer A’s component 1 and an ideal component
2 that is d2 away from A’s component 2. Similarly, the distances between the consumer’s ideal
point and manufacturer B’s components are 1 − d1 and 1 − d2, respectively. Every consumer is
assumed to purchase at most one system. When the components are directly sold to consumers,
each consumer purchases the two components in the fixed proportion of one unit of component 1
to each unit of component 2.
Figure 1.1: Location of Manufacturers and Consumers on the Unit Square
6For an analysis of the firms’ decision on compatibility, see Matutes and Regibeau (1988).
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A consumer buying one unit of system Xij has a surplus of C − k(d1i + d2j) − Pij , where
C is the reservation price common to all the consumers, and parameter k measures the degree of
horizontal product differentiation among the goods. d1i and d2j are the distances of the consumer’s
ideal components 1 and 2 from system Xij . Pij is the price for the system Xij , including the
integration costs when the consumer herself integrates the components into the system. C is
assumed to be so high that all markets are covered.
Though all the components are compatible, it is costly to integrate different manufacturers’
components into a mixed system. The integration costs for consumers, zI1 , are higher than the
costs for TPCIs or the manufacturers’ subsidiaries, zI2 , reflecting economies of scale. The assump-
tions on the dissolution costs, zDi , are similar. The integration costs can be any positive number
theoretically. But, if these costs are bigger than k, the mixed system market vanishes. Since the
focus of this chapter is on the structure of mixed system markets, this chapter rules out the case
when zIi > k.
7
The whole game has three stages. In the first stage, manufacturers A and B simultaneously
decide how to sell components. The manufacturers can sell their components to consumers or
mixed system integrators such as TPCIs or their own subsidiaries. In the second stage, the two
manufacturers announce their system and component prices. If the manufacturers’ decisions in
the first stage result in no other type of mixed system integrators than consumers, consumers
purchase systems or components at the second stage and the game ends. If there are mixed system
integrators other than consumers, they decide prices in the third stage. All systems are sold to
the public, while the components are sold in the way decided in the first stage. Resale of the
components is assumed to not be possible.8 This possibly unrealistic assumption allows a clearer
7The analysis of the cases with no mixed system market will be the same as in Matutes and
Regibeau (1988). Unlike zIi , there is no upper limit on z
D
i .
8Resale of the components between consumers or from consumers to firms are assumed too
costly to happen. In addition, the manufacturers may be able to prohibit the firms who bought
their components from reselling them.
5
comparison of the outcomes in each mixed system market structure.
Another scenario for the timing of the game is possible: in the second stage the two man-
ufacturers decide only their component prices and in the final stage all of the system prices are
decided. Since the results under this alternative scenario are complex and the two scenarios share
many results, this chapter focuses on the above scenario. Appendix A reports the equilibrium
under the alternative scenario.
In the first stage, each manufacturer has several ways to sell its components. It can sell its
components directly to consumers or TPCIs. There are many potential TPCIs in the industry. If
both manufacturers sell their components to all TPCIs, the TPCIs will have a Bertrand competi-
tion, pricing their mixed systems at marginal costs that are the sum of the component prices and
the integration costs. If the manufacturers decide to sell their components to only one and the
same TPCI at each point, the TPCI will have a local monopoly power.
The manufacturers can also establish subsidiaries in the first stage. When a manufacturer
builds its own subsidiaries, the manufacturer maximizes the total profits of the vertical structure,
the manufacturer itself and its subsidiaries. A manufacturer has two options with regard to es-
tablishing subsidiaries: to establish one subsidiary at (1,0) or (0,1), or to establish one subsidiary
at both (1,0) and (0,1). Since mixed system integrators face price competition, the manufacturers
do not have any incentives to build more than one subsidiary at each point. For a similar reason,
a manufacturer with a subsidiary(ies) may want to provide its components exclusively to its own
subsidiary(ies). However, a subsidiary needs both manufacturers’ components in order to produce
mixed systems. This chapter will focus on the case where manufacturers provide their components
for all subsidiaries of both manufacturers.9
In summary, in the first stage each manufacturer has the following five options: (1) to sell
9If the two manufacturers do not sell their components to their rival’s subsidiary(ies), there
would be no mixed systems, resulting in competition between the two original systems. Similarly,
when the manufacturers decide to sell their components to different TPCIs, no TPCIs will be able
to produce mixed systems. However, these cases are not the equilibrium because each manufacturer
can be better off from changing its own choices about TPCIs.
6
its components to consumers; (2) to sell its components to one TPCI at each point; (3) to sell
its components to all TPCIs at each point; (4) to establish one subsidiary at a point and provide
its components for all subsidiaries10; (5) to establish one subsidiary at each point and provide its
components for all subsidiaries.
1.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits
This section presents the equilibrium prices and profits in the various mixed system market struc-
tures that result from the two manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage. For calculation of the
equilibrium, a symmetric equilibrium is assumed to exist and symmetry conditions are imposed.11
If both manufacturers decide to sell their components directly to consumers in the first stage,
only consumers will integrate the components into the mixed systems. When the manufacturers
decide to sell their components to any TPCIs at each point, there are many TPCIs producing
mixed systems XAB and XBA. Since the TPCIs face the Bertrand competition, they will be called
competitive TPCIs. On the other hand, if the manufacturers’ decisions are to sell the components
to the same TPCI at each mixed system market, the TPCI will be the only mixed system provider
at each point. This TPCI will be called the locally monopolistic TPCI. When each manufacturer
establishes one subsidiary at a point and provides its components for all the subsidiaries, each
subsidiary will be the only mixed system provider at each point.12 We will call these subsidiaries
locally monopolistic subsidiaries. If each manufacturer decides to establish a subsidiary at each
point and to provide its components to all the subsidiaries, there will be two subsidiaries in each
mixed system market. These subsidiaries will be called competitive subsidiaries.
10For example, if manufacturer A establishes a subsidiary at (0,1), it provides its component 1
for its subsidiary and sells its component 2 to manufacturer B’s subsidiary.
11These equilibrium prices and profits are shown to be valid by numerical computations with
the integration costs fixed at values 0, 0.1, 0.2, ... , 1.0.
12If both manufacturers establish their subsidiaries at the same point, then no subsidiaries can
make mixed systems.
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It should be noted that each case has an equilibrium corresponding to competition between
two systems only. When the manufacturers set their component prices so high that any unilateral
changes in the component prices cannot make the mixed system integration profitable, there remain
only the two manufacturers’ original systems in the last stage. In essence, these equilibria are the
same as in the cases where the manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage lead to no mixed system
integrators, and are not the focus of this chapter.
1.3.1 Consumers
Let us begin with the case when both manufacturers decide to sell their components directly to
consumers in the first stage.13 In this case, it takes integration costs of zI1 for a consumer to
assemble a mixed system. Since every consumer’s reservation price, C, is assumed to be high
enough for the whole market to be covered, a consumer at (d1, d2) will purchase system XAA when
the following inequalities hold:
PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ P1A + P2B + zI1 + k(d1 + 1− d2);
PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ P1B + P2A + zI1 + k(1− d1 + d2);
and PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ PBB + k(1− d1 + 1− d2).
Pii is the price for system Xii, and P1i and P2i are the prices for manufacturer i’s components
















2k )]. DBB , DAB and DBB are defined similarly. DBB = (1−
−zI1+k−P1A+PBB−P2B
2k )·










2k )]. DAB = (1 −
zI1+k+P1A−PAA+P2B
2k ) · (
−zI1+k−P1A+PBB−P2B
2k ). DBA = (1 −
13The analysis in this subsection is almost the same as in Matutes and Regibeau (1992) except
that the consumers must pay costs for integrating the components.
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zI1+k+P2A−PAA+P1B
2k ) · (
−zI1+k−P2A+PBB−P1B
2k ). (See Figure 1.2.)
Figure 1.2: Demands for the Systems
Manufacturer A’s profit maximization problem is the following:
Max
PAA,P1A,P2A
fA (PAA, P1A, P2A; PBB , P1B , P2B) = PAADAA + P1ADAB + P2ADBA.
Manufacturer B has a similar profit maximization problem.
As stated earlier, when consumers themselves integrate mixed systems, the game ends at
the second stage. The equilibrium system prices and profits can be obtained from the two manu-
facturers’ profit maximization problems and the symmetry conditions of PAA = PBB , P1A = P1B
and P2A = P2B . PAA = PBB = 4k
2
3k+zI1




ΠAA = ΠBB =
67k4−8zI1k3+6(zI1)2k2−(zI1)4
32(3k+zI1)
. In addition, DAB = DBA =
(k−zI1)2
16k2 .
If we compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium in the case where consumers have to
choose only from the two manufacturers’ original systems, we will find that selling components
and systems (mixed bundling) is preferable to the manufacturer over selling only systems (pure









Pure bundling gives lower profits to the manufacturers than mixed bundling, because pure
bundling intensifies the competition between the two manufacturers. With pure bundling, a de-
crease in PAA, for example, increases the demand for system XAA, decreasing only the demand
for XBB . When the two manufacturers use mixed bundling, the same decrease in PAA decreases
not only the demand for XBB but also the demands for XAB and XBA that use manufacturer A’s
components. Thus, the manufacturers have fewer incentives to lower their prices when they use
mixed bundling.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988) find that selling only components (pure component selling)
is more preferable to the manufacturers than pure bundling for a similar reason. Anderson and
Leruth (1993) show that similar results can be attained using a discrete choice framework.
1.3.2 Competitive TPCIs
When both manufacturers decide to sell their components to all TPCIs at each point in the first
stage, there will be many TPCIs producing mixed systems XAB and XBA. Consumer demands are
different from those expressed in subsection 3.1, because now consumers only observe system prices
not component prices. DAA = (k+PAB−PAA2k ) · (k+PBA−PAA2k ) − 12 [(k+PBA−PAA2k ) − (k−PAB+PBB2k )] ·
[(k+PAB−PAA2k )− (k−PBA+PBB2k )]. DBB = (1− k−PAB+PBB2k ) · (1− k−PBA+PBB2k )− 12 [(k+PBA−PAA2k )−
(k−PAB+PBB2k )] · [(k+PAB−PAA2k )− (k−PBA+PBB2k )]. DAB = (1− k+PAB−PAA2k ) · (k−PAB+PBB2k ). DBA =
(1− k+PBA−PAA2k ) · (k−PBA+PBB2k ).
However, the two manufacturers face the same profit maximization problems as in subsection
3.1, except that zI1 is replaced by z
I
2 . This is because the competitive TPCIs that are competing
in prices set their mixed system prices at their marginal costs.14 Therefore, the equilibrium prices
PAA = PBB = 4k
2
3k+zI2
and P1A = P2A = P1B = P2B =
11k2−2zI2k−(zI2)2
4(3k+zI2)




and the demand for mixed systems DAB = DBA =
(k−zI2)2
16k2 . The
14Thus, PAB = P1A + P2B + zI2 and PBA = P1B + P2A + z
I
2 in the last stage.
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following proposition compares this equilibrium with the equilibrium in the previous section.
Proposition 1 When the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs, the equilib-
rium original system and component prices, profits and demand for a mixed system are always
higher than when the manufacturers sell their components to consumers. The mixed system prices
are always lower when the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs than when
the manufacturers sell their components to consumers.
Proof. The only difference in the equilibrium prices and profits is the magnitude of the integration
costs. Since the equilibrium system and component prices, profits and demand for a mixed system
are decreasing in the integration costs, the assumption of zI1 > z
I
2 is sufficient to prove the above
proposition. The equilibrium mixed system price increases in the integration costs.
Higher integration costs lead to lower equilibrium prices because they bring more fierce
competition between the manufacturers, just as bundling does. The rise in such costs make the
mixed system prices higher, resulting in smaller demand for the mixed systems. The smaller the
mixed system markets are, the bigger incentives to cut the prices the manufacturers have. This is
because a manufacturer’s decrease of its system price will do less harm to its component sales if
the mixed system markets are smaller. Meanwhile, the equilibrium mixed system price increases
in the integration costs because component prices decrease less rapidly than the integration costs
rise.
It is interesting that higher integration costs intensify the competition between the manu-
facturers even when the manufacturers sell only their components. For a clearer comparison, let
us consider the two cases of zero and positive integration costs. Without the integration costs,
the market for a manufacturer’s original system is contiguous with the markets for mixed systems
only. If integration requires positive costs, however, the markets for the manufacturers’ original
systems border each other. When manufacturer B lowers the price of its component 2, the de-
mands for XBB and XAB will increase (See Figure 1.3.) The shaded areas represent increases
in the manufacturer B’s component sales, while the area with broad lines show increases in the
sales of manufacturer B’s systems, that is, both components. Thus, the manufacturers have more
11
incentives to lower their prices when their original systems’ markets border each other.
Figure 1.3: Effects of Manufacturer B’s Price Decrease When the Integration Costs Are Zero and
Positive
1.3.3 Locally monopolistic TPCIs
If the manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage are to sell the components to only one and the
same TPCI at each point, the TPCIs will be the only mixed system providers. Since the TPCIs
have market power, they will choose their mixed system prices maximizing their profits in the
third stage. Considering these mixed system prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in
the second stage. The manufacturers’ profit functions are similar to those in subsection 3.2.
From the profit maximization problems of the manufacturers and the TPCIs and the sym-
metry conditions, PAA = PBB = 6k
2
5k+zI2










.15 The profits ΠAA = ΠBB =
221k4−14zI2k3+12(zI2)2k2−2(zI2)3k−(zI2)4
72k2(5k+zI2)
and the demand for mixed systems DAB = DBA =
(k−zI2)2
36k2 . Comparing these results with the
equilibrium in subsection 3.2 leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs, the equilib-
15Solutions of the FOC’s of the locally monopolistic TPCIs’ profit maximization problems in
the last stage are functions of the prices that are decided in the second stage. The equilibrium
prices in the second stage are derived from plugging these functions into the manufacturers’ profit
functions and solving the resulting FOC’s for the original system and component prices.
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rium original system and component prices, profits and demand for a mixed system are always
higher than when the manufacturers sell their components to monopolistic TPCIs. The mixed sys-
tem prices are always lower when the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs
than when the manufacturers sell their components to monopolistic TPCIs.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is similar to that of Proposition 1. The poorer results for
the manufacturers when they sell their components to locally monopolistic TPCIs are because of
the resulting fiercer competition between themselves. Since the locally monopolistic TPCIs’ prices
are higher than their costs, they might possibly keep the manufacturers’ prices high. However,
as the locally monopolistic TPCIs’ markets shrink, the manufacturers become more aggressive in
their pricing.
1.3.4 Locally monopolistic subsidiaries
When each manufacturer decides to establish one subsidiary at a point and to sell its components
to all the subsidiaries, each subsidiary will be the only mixed system provider at each point. In the
second stage, the manufacturers decide their original system and component prices simultaneously.
In the last stage, the subsidiaries decide their mixed system prices at the same time. Now the
manufacturers maximize the total profits of their vertical structures. If manufacturer A’s subsidiary
locates at (0,1) and B’s subsidiary at (1,0), for example, vertical structure A’s profit function is
fA (PAA, P1A, P2A;PBB , P1B , P2B , PAB , PBA) = PAADAA + (PAB − P2B − zI2)DAB + P2ADBA.
Manufacturer B’s vertical structure has a similar profit function. The demands for systems are
defined in the same way as in subsections 3.2 and 3.3.
From the two vertical structures’ profit maximization problems and the symmetry condi-
tions, PAA = PBB = 6k
2
5k+zI2
, P2A = P2B =
14k2−4zI2k−(zI2)2
3(5k+zI2)







Note that a vertical structure is selling only one component to its rival’s subsidiary. The prof-
its ΠAA = ΠBB =
2287k4−280zI2k3+240(zI2)2k2−40(zI2)3k−20(zI2)4
729k2(5k+zI2)
and the demand for mixed systems
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DAB = DBA =
4(k−zI2)2
81k2 . Comparison of these results with the equilibria in subsections 3.2 and
3.3 are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The ranking of the equilibrium prices, profits and demand for a mixed system are
the following.
Mixed System Price : PAB (mono.TPCI) > PAB (comp.TPCI) > PAB (subsidiaries)
Component Price : P2A (subsidiaries) > P2A (comp.TPCI) > P2A (mono.TPCI)
Original System Price : PAA (comp.TPCI) > PAA (subsidiaries) = PAA (mono.TPCI)
Mixed System Demand : DAB (comp.TPCI) > DAB (subsidiaries) > DAB (mono.TPCI)
Profits : ΠAA (comp.TPCI) > ΠAA (subsidiaries) > ΠAA (mono.TPCI)
When a vertical structure decides its mixed system price in the last stage, it may have less
incentive to lower that price than a TPCI because its lowered mixed system price decreases its orig-
inal system sales. However, its mixed system price is lower than a TPCI’s because the subsidiary’s
marginal costs (price of a component plus integration costs) is lower than a TPCI’s marginal costs
(sum of the prices of two components plus integration costs). With higher integration costs, the
effect of the difference in marginal costs is smaller.
When the manufacturers or vertical structures decide their component prices in the second
stage, they will decide the component prices at the level equating what they earn marginally
and what they lose marginally. When they raise their component prices, they earn the in-
crease in the unit price and the increase in the original system sales. On the other hand,
they lose some of their component sales. Since the original system sales are more important
to them than the component sales,16 they want the mixed system price at a level where the de-






(PAA)2 − 2PAAPBB + (PBB)2 + 16k2DAB , the vertical structures have the largest incentive to
raise the component price. In addition, manufacturers selling their components to competitive
16The marginal profits from original system sales are higher than the marginal profits from com-
ponent sales, unless the original system price is lower than the component price. If the component
price is higher than the original system price, no mixed system will be sold.
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TPCIs have larger incentive to raise the component price than manufacturers selling their compo-
nents to locally monopolistic TPCIs. Note that locally monopolistic TPCIs’ mixed system prices
are higher than those of competitive TPCIs because of the markup over the costs.
The decision about the component price is made at the same time with the decision about the
original system price. An interesting result is that the original system price of a vertical structure
is the same as that of a manufacturer selling its components to locally monopolistic TPCIs, even
though the locally monopolistic TPCIs’ mixed system markets are smaller than those of the vertical
structures. This is because vertical structures raise the component prices so high that their mixed
system sales become less attractive. In fact, a manufacturer’s markup over the costs for a mixed
system is less than its component price and the component price of a manufacturer with locally
monopolistic TPCIs. Thus, original system sales are more important to a vertical structure than
to a manufacturer with TPCIs, leading to more aggressive original system pricing.
1.3.5 Competitive subsidiaries
If each manufacturer decides to establish a subsidiary at each point and to provide its components
for all the subsidiaries, then two subsidiaries will produce each of the mixed systems XAB and XBA.
Vertical structure A, manufacturer A and its two subsidiaries, has the following profit function
fA (PAA, P1A, P2A;PBB , P1B , P2B , PAB , PBA) =













Vertical structure B has a similar profit function. If two subsidiaries, one of manufacturer A
and the other of B, exist together at a point, their mixed system prices should be the same.
Furthermore, each subsidiary’s markup over the costs should be equal to its mother firm’s price
for the component which is sold to its rival. If the markup is lower than the component price, the
subsidiary will raise its mixed system price, making more profits from the component sales. On
the other hand, if the markup is higher than the component price, the subsidiary will lower its
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mixed system price slightly, driving its rival away from the mixed system market. Thus, if two
subsidiaries are active, PAB must be equal to P1A +P2B + zI2 , resulting in the same profit function
and the same equilibrium as in subsection 3.2 where the manufacturers sell their components to
competitive TPCIs.
In the second stage, a manufacturer may want to make its rival’s or its own subsidiary
withdraw from the mixed system market by changing its original system or component prices. If a
manufacturer changes its original system price, it will affect all the mixed system providers equally.
Thus, changing the original system price cannot affect the subsidiaries’ decisions of whether to exit
or to stay. Though changes in the component prices can make the subsidiaries exit, the resulting
equilibrium is the same as in subsection 3.2. A more detailed explanation is in the proof of the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 When each manufacturer establishes a subsidiary at each point, the equilibrium is
the same as when the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs.
Proof. Consider a situation where all the prices are the same as when the manufacturers provide
their components to competitive TPCIs. Changes in the component prices can make a subsidiary
exit. Suppose manufacturer A increases P1A from P ′1A to P
′′
1A. Then, manufacturer B’s subsidiary
will exit from the market for XAB . Manufacturer A’s subsidiary at the mixed system market can
increase its markup by the amount of the increase in the component price. What manufacturer A
earns are area u ·∆markupmixed and area w · (markup′original −markup′mixed). Manufacturer A
loses its component sales by the amount of the area v. (See figure 1.4.)
Before the change in P1A, manufacturer A’s profits from the market for XAB are 12 (u + v +
w) ·markup′mixed + 12 (u+ v +w) ·P ′1A. Since markup′mixed = P ′1A, the profits are equal to (u+ v +
w) ·markup′mixed. After the change in P1A, the profits are u ·markup′′mixed + w ·markup′original.
The difference between these two profits are [u ·markup′′mixed + w ·markup′original]− [(u + v + w) ·
markup′mixed] = [u ·∆markupmixed + w · (markup′original −markup′mixed)]− [v ·markup′mixed].
Now consider the situation where both manufacturers sell their components to competitive
TPCIs. An increase in P1A from P ′1A to P
′′
1A will give manufacturer A the additional profits of
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Figure 1.4: When Manufacturer A Raises the Price for Its Component 1
area u ·∆P1A and area w · (markup′original−P ′1A). The loss to manufacturer A is v ·P ′1A from the
decrease in the sales of its component 1. Since markup′mixed = P
′
1A and ∆markupmixed = ∆P1A,
the earnings in the two situations are the same and the losses in the two situations are also the
same. This logic can be applied to the case when the manufacturer lowers its component price.
1.4 Equilibrium Market Structure
In this section, we consider the two manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage. Up to now, we have
seen the equilibria in the cases where the manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage are the same.
Consideration of the other cases where the manufacturers’ decisions are different will complete the
payoff matrix that the manufacturers face in the first stage.
Manufacturer B: providing components for
(a) (b) one TPCI (c) any TPCIs (d) two (e) four
consumers at each point at each point Subsidiaries Subsidiaries
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Table 1.1: Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers
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If manufacturer A sells its components directly to consumers only and manufacturer B
sells to TPCIs, no mixed system can be made. This result is from the assumption of no resale
of the components. Consumers can not make mixed systems because they are not provided the
components from B. Similarly, TPCIs cannot produce mixed systems without A’s components.
The market structure in this case is the same as when the manufacturers use pure bundling. A
similar logic can be applied to the cases where the manufacturers choose the strategy combinations
(a,d) or (a,e).
The results are also the same when manufacturer A sells its components to only one TPCI
at each point and manufacturer B sells components to consumers or subsidiaries. However, if A
sells its components to only one TPCI at each point and B sells to any TPCIs, the equilibrium is
the same as when both manufacturers sell the components to one TPCI.
When the manufacturers choose the strategy combination (d,e), the equilibrium payoffs are
the same as when they choose (d,d). If manufacturer A chooses (d) and B chooses (e), then B’s
subsidiary at (0,1) is not provided A’s component 1.
The above analysis and the previous propositions result in the following proposition about
the equilibrium of the whole game.
Proposition 5 The equilibria of the whole game are symmetric. If manufacturer A chooses an
action, B’s best response is to follow A’s action.
Proof. The equilibrium sets of strategy are (a,a), (b,b), (c,c), (d,d) and (e,e) because 12k < Π
aa <
Πcc = Πee and 12k < Π
bb < Πdd < Πcc = Πee from the propositions 1 to 4.
Note that though there are five equilibrium strategy combinations, the best outcomes to
the manufacturers are achieved when they choose (c,c) or (e,e). Competition in the mixed system
markets gives the manufacturers the highest profits.
1.5 When There Are Intra-firm Trades of Components
In the analysis up to now, the assumption of no resale was applied to all cases including the
case where each manufacturer has a subsidiary at each point. It implies that the manufacturers
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recognize the buyers and prevent them from reselling. Suppose, for example, B cannot prevent
the trade of components within vertical structure A (manufacturer A and A’s two subsidiaries)
and B’s original system price is low relative to the sum of its component prices. Since B sells
its components to vertical structure A’s subsidiaries and its systems to the public, manufacturer
A has opportunity for arbitrage by purchasing B’s low-priced original systems, breaking them up
into components, giving them to its subsidiaries, and making mixed systems at lower costs.
Likewise, TPCIs may have similar opportunity for arbitrage. Up to now, the TPCIs are
assumed to be at either (0,1) or (1,0). However, it is also possible that some TPCIs purchase the
components from both A and B and sell both mixed systems.17 These TPCIs can be interpreted
to have two branches at each of the points (0,1) and (1,0). Since these TPCIs can also purchase
the original systems, they have opportunity for arbitrage.
This section analyzes the equilibrium when this arbitrage behavior is possible. There are
three subcases: (1) when each manufacturer decides to establish a subsidiary at each point; (2)
when the manufacturers decide to sell their components to any TPCIs who have two branches;
and (3) when the manufacturers decide to sell their components to a TPCI who has two branches.
In any subcase, the arbitrage behavior places a constraint on the manufacturers’ pricing.
If there are no integration or dissolution costs, a system price should be equal to the sum of
the component prices. Introduction of the integration and dissolution costs, however, limits the
arbitrage behavior, relaxing the constraint on the manufacturers’ pricing. As a result, a system’s
price has only to be in a range around the sum of the component prices. That is, a manufacturer
can choose its system price in the range of [sum of the prices of components – zD, sum of the prices
of components + zI ]18. If the price of a system is lower than the sum of the prices of components
minus zD, component integrators will buy systems and break them up into components. If the
price of a system is higher than the sum of the component prices plus zI , component integrators
17In reality, many TPCIs sell various systems which include different brands of components.




will buy components to make systems at a lower price than the manufacturer.









gA1 = −PAA + P1A + P2A − zD ≤ 0
gA2 = PAA − P1A − P2A − zI ≤ 0
.
Manufacturer B has a similar constrained profit maximization problem.
1.5.1 Competitive TPCIs or competitive subsidiaries
Let us consider the subcase of competitive TPCIs or competitive subsidiaries first. As in subsections
3.2 and 3.5, PAB = P1A+P2B+zI2 and PBA = P1B+P2A+z
I
2 . The symmetric equilibrium is derived
from the above two constrained profit maximization problems and the symmetry conditions. The
following proposition summarizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 When the manufacturers sell their components to competitive TPCIs or com-
petitive subsidiaries with arbitrage constraints on their pricing, The constraints gA1 and g
B
1 bind














. If k < 2zD + zI , the equilibrium is the same as in subsection 3.2, the case
without the arbitrage constraints. The constraints gA2 and g
B
2 never bind.
Proof. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the profit maximization problems should be satisfied
simultaneously. In addition, in Nash equilibrium each player takes the rival’s prices as given.
Therefore, the symmetric Nash equilibrium19 will satisfy one of the following:
(i)5 fA(P ∗A; P ∗B) = 0,5fB(P ∗B ;P ∗A) = 0 and gA1 (·), gA2 (·), gB1 (·), gB2 (·) < 0;
19From the symmetry assumption, the two manufacturers’ decisions satisfy the same one of the
conditions.
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(ii)5 fA(P ∗A; P ∗B) + λA1 5 gA1 (P ∗A;P ∗B) = 0,5fB(P ∗B ; P ∗A) + λB1 5 gB1 (P ∗B ; P ∗A) = 0;
(iii)5 fA(P ∗A;P ∗B) + λA2 5 gA2 (P ∗A; P ∗B) = 0,5fB(P ∗B ;P ∗A) + λB2 5 gB2 (P ∗B ; P ∗A) = 0.














are valid when gA1 (·) = −P ∗AA + P ∗1A + P ∗2A − zD < 0, that is, 2zD + zI > k. gA2 (·) = P ∗AA − P ∗1A −
P ∗2A − zI = − (z
I+k)
2 is always less than zero. Case (ii) produces the above equilibrium prices and
the value of λA1 is
(k−2zD−zI)(k−zD−zI)
4k2 . When 2z
D + zI < k, λA1 > 0. There is no valid solution
in case (iii) because λA2 =
−2zI−k
4k is always negative.
1.5.2 Monopolistic TPCI
When the manufacturers sell their components to a TPCI who has two branches, the TPCI has
market power in both mixed system markets. This TPCI also has opportunity for arbitrage. If the
component prices are too high, the TPCI will buy and dissolve systems to provide the components
for its branches. The equilibrium is derived from the profit maximization problems of this TPCI
and the manufacturers, and the symmetry conditions.
Proposition 7 When the manufacturers sell their components to a monopolistic TPCI who has
a branch at each point, gA1 and g
B
1 bind if 2z





















k < 2zD +zI , the equilibrium is the same as in Section 3, the case without the arbitrage constraint.
The constraints gA2 and g
B
2 never bind.
Proof. The equilibrium should satisfy the profit maximization conditions of the locally monopo-
listic TPCI in addition to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the manufacturers’ profit maximization
problems. Therefore, the symmetric Nash equilibrium will satisfy one of the following:
(i)5 fA(·) = 0,5fB(·) = 0, gA1 (·), gA2 (·), gB1 (·), gB2 (·) < 0and5 fAB(·) +5fBA(·) = 0;
(ii)5 fA(·) + λA1 5 gA1 (·) = 0,5fB(·) + λB1 5 gB1 (·) = 0 and 5 fAB(·) +5fBA(·) = 0;
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(iii)5 fA(·) + λA2 5 gA2 (·) = 0,5fB(·) + λB2 5 gB2 (·) = 0 and 5 fAB(·) +5fBA(·) = 0.



















are valid when gA1 (·) = −P ∗AA + P ∗1A + P ∗2A − zD < 0, that
is, 2zD + zI > k. gA2 (·) = P ∗AA − P ∗1A − P ∗2A − zI = − (z
I+k)
2 is always less than zero. Case (ii)
produces the above solutions and the value of λA1 is
(k−2zD−zI)(k−zD−zI)
9k2 . When 2z
D + zI < k,




9k is always negative.
1.5.3 Discussion
The equilibrium original system price decreases in the dissolution costs. The equilibrium is at the
lower boundary of the arbitrage constraint on the system price. Thus, if the dissolution costs are
higher, a manufacturer can cut its system price to a lower level. In other words, the dissolution
costs act like a brake on the two manufacturers’ price competition.
Also note that the equilibrium prices in the case with a monopolistic TPCI are lower than
the prices in the case with competitive TPCIs as long as gA1 and g
B
1 bind. This is from the same
logic that is in subsection 3.3. Competition between the manufacturers’ original systems becomes
fiercer as the locally monopolistic TPCIs’ markets shrink.
Binding constraints are more preferable to the manufacturers than unconstrained profit
maximization. When 2zD + zI < k, the condition for the arbitrage constraint to bind, the manu-
facturers enjoy higher profits together with higher equilibrium original system prices. This advan-
tage arises because the arbitrage limits competition between the manufacturers. Zero dissolution
costs limit the competition between the manufacturers maximally, letting the equilibrium original
system price be exactly twice the equilibrium component price. If the dissolution costs are very
high, the constraint is too wide to limit the competition between the manufacturers.
1.6 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare
This section compares consumer surplus and social welfare, the joint profits and consumer surplus,
in each mixed system market structure.
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In this model, C, the reservation price common to all the consumers distributed in a unit
square, is the maximum value for consumer surplus or social welfare. Since a consumer buying
one unit of system Xij has a utility of C − k(d1i + d2j) − Pij , consumer surplus decreases in
transportation costs and system prices. Figure 1.5 shows consumer surplus under the five mixed
system market structures. In this figure, the dissolution costs are assumed to be the same as
the integration costs for a simpler calculation. The horizontal axis stands for the value of the
integration costs as the ratio over k. The vertical axis represents the amount that is deducted
from the maximum consumer surplus, C, also as the ratio over k.
The calculation of consumer surplus shows that competitive TPCIs give the least surplus
to the consumers. This surprising result arises because price effects dominate the effects of trans-
portation costs on consumer surplus. Though competitive TPCIs minimize the total transporta-
tion costs, the higher system prices thanks to the competition in the mixed system markets leave
the least surplus to the consumers. Consumer surplus is highest when monopolistic subsidiaries
produce mixed systems. Locally monopolistic TPCIs also give consumers higher surplus than
competitive TPCIs. Likewise, intra-firm trades of components are bad news to consumers.
Consumer surplus increases in integration costs because higher integration costs bring fiercer
competition between original systems and lower prices. In addition, as the integration costs increase
and thus the mixed system markets shrink, the differences in the consumer surplus decrease.
Unlike consumer surplus, social welfare does not depend on the system prices. Social welfare
in this model depends only on transportation, integration and dissolution costs. There is a trade-
off between these factors. Higher market shares of mixed systems accompany higher integration
costs, but also lower transportation costs to consumers. Figure 1.6 compares social welfare in the
five mixed system market structures and the social planner’s. In this figure also, the dissolution
costs are assumed to be the same as the integration costs. The horizontal axis is the same as in
Figure 1.5. The vertical axis represents the amount that is deducted from the maximum social
welfare, C, as the ratio over k.
Figure 1.6 shows that competitive TPCIs produce social welfare closest to the social plan-
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Figure 1.5: Comparison of Consumer Surplus under Each Mixed System Market Structure
ner’s20. From the social planner’s perspective, the only difference between the values of mixed
and original systems is the integration costs. For example, when the integration costs are zero,
the social planner assigns half of the market to the mixed systems. The competition between the
original systems places a lower price to the original systems than their socially desirable level.
When the manufacturers’ original systems face less fierce competition, the original system price is
closer to its socially desirable value. Since the competitive TPCIs give the manufacturers the least
fierce competition, they also bring the highest social welfare.
20The social planner sets the market for a mixed system market equal to (k−z
I)2
4k2 , producing








Figure 1.6: Comparison of Social Welfare under Each Mixed System Market Structure
1.7 Conclusion
The following intuitions can summarize the results of this chapter. Manufacturers can benefit from
more competition in the mixed system markets, because it lessens the competition between their
original systems. In addition, the lower the integration or dissolution costs are, the less fierce the
competition between the manufacturers is.
These intuitions make us understand better why ”plug and play” technology is valuable to
the manufacturers. If all components are ”plug and play”, there are no integration or dissolution
costs. If the manufacturers bring competition in the making of the mixed systems,21 then they
21In this situation, the manufacturers’ profits are maximized when they sell their components
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will enjoy the minimum level of competition, or, the minimum level of freedom in their pricing. In
other words, ”plug and play” enables the manufacturers to commit not to use mixed bundling.
In the model of this chapter, the results for the cases with competitive TPCIs and with
competitive subsidiaries are the same. This is because the competition in the mixed market is a
Bertrand game. A modification of this aspect, such as a Cournot game instead, could shed more
light on the relationship between the competition in the mixed system market and the competition
in the original system market.
There are many other areas for extension or modification of the model in this chapter.
Analysis of N manufacturers’ case can be tried. Another interesting extension will introduce
new players such as system makers who do not produce all the components. They may have
incentives different from the manufacturers of all components or the pure TPCIs. In addition,
their introduction will make a more realistic model.
to consumers, competitive TPCIs or competitive subsidiaries.
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Chapter 2
Upstream Manufacturers Selling Components and Bundles for System Markets
2.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the previous chapter’s topic, the interaction between competitions in a system
market. Competition often brings efficient resource allocation, maximizing social welfare. However,
if there are several kinds of competition in a market and a certain competition can soften other
kinds of competition, it is unclear which type of competition should be encouraged or not. The
previous chapter finds that more competition in the mixed system markets lessens the competition
between the duopolists’ original systems. The more competition in the mixed system provision
gives more profits to the duopolists but less surplus to the consumers.
This chapter extends the previous chapter’s analysis, considering the structures of both
downstream markets, not only for the mixed systems but also for the manufacturers’ original
systems. For this objective, the duopolistic manufacturers are assumed not to take part in the
downstream markets themselves. Instead they decide the market structure for their original sys-
tems. If a manufacturer chooses a retailer to sell its original systems, then the retailer will be a
local monopolist. If the manufacturer chooses to sell its bundles to any retailers who want to enter
the market for its original systems, then the original system market will be competitive. As in
the previous chapter, the two manufacturers’ decisions of to whom to sell their components jointly
determine the market structure for the mixed systems.
This chapter finds that locally monopolistic retailers bring higher profits to the manufac-
turers than competitive retailers do. Introduction of a retailer causes the manufacturer to raise its
price. This manufacturer’s profits will increase proportionally if every consumer has a unit demand
and his/her reservation price is high enough. Duopolists competing over consumers located on a
line also have this incentive. There are additional benefits to the duopolists from having their
own monopolistic retailers, if they are competing over consumers on a sqare. First, the locally
monopolistic retailers make the competition between the original systems less fierce. The markups
on the bundle prices by the locally monopolistic retailers shorten the border between the original
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system markets. The shortened border enables the two duopolistic manufacturers keep higher
prices. Second, the manufacturers’ incentives to cut their bundle prices are fewer relative to their
incentives to cut their component prices, because the manufacturers cannot take the full benefits
from cutting their bundle prices.
A surprising result comes when a manufacturer chose a locally monopolistic retailer and its
rival chose competitive retailers. In this situation, the manufacturer with a locally monopolistic
retailer prices its bundle higher than the sum of its component prices. This manufacturer is not
aggressive in bundle pricing, while its rival is aggressive because it does not lose the benefits from
cutting its bundle price to anyone. These incentives are combined to induce the manufacturer with
a locally monopolistic retailer to price its bundle high relative to its component prices, and its rival
to price its bundle low relative to its component prices. The rival’s bundle price is very close to or
even lower than the price of its one component.
Section 2 presents the basic model. The equilibrium prices and profits under each down-
stream market structure are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 presents the equilibrium downstream
market structure. Analyses of consumer surplus and social welfare are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The basic model is the same as in Chapter 1. A system is composed of two components, 1 and
2. Two manufacturers, A and B, are producing the components at zero marginal cost. The
components are assumed to be compatible with the other manufacturer’s matching components.
Consequently, there are four possible options for the system, two original and two mixed systems;
XAA, XBB , XAB , XBA. Unlike in Chapter 1, the two manufacturers do not sell their systems to
consumers. Instead they choose the retailers who will sell their original systems to the consumers.
As in Chapter 1, the manufacturers choose the mixed system makers to whom they sell their
components.
Assumptions about consumers are the same as in the previous chapters. Consumers are
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uniformly distributed on the unit square (see Figure 2.1). Four systems are located at the corners.
A consumer located at the point of coordinates (d1, d2) has an ideal component 1 that is d1 away
from manufacturer A’s component 1 and an ideal component 2 that is d2 away from A’s component
2. Similarly, the distances between the consumer’s ideal point and manufacturer B’s components
are 1− d1 and 1− d2, respectively. Every consumer is assumed to purchase at most one system.
Figure 2.1: Locations of the Four Systems and Consumers on the Unit Square
A consumer buying one unit of system Xij has a surplus of C − k(d1i + d2j) − Pij , where
C is the reservation price common to all the consumers and parameter k measures the degree of
horizontal product differentiation among the goods. d1i and d2j are the distances of the consumer’s
ideal components 1 and 2 from system Xij and Pij is its price. C is assumed to be high enough
for the whole market to be covered by any type of system makers.
To focus on the downstream market structure, consumers are not assumed to be able to
integrate components into a system. Also for simplicity, the integration costs are assumed to be
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zero.22 Since resale is not allowed, the assumption about the dissolution costs is not needed.
The whole game has three stages as in Chapter 1. In the first stage, manufacturers A
and B simultaneously decide to whom to sell their components and bundles. If their decisions
create local monopoly, they also decide, in this stage, the fixed fees that are charged to the locally
monopolistic retailers and mixed system makers for the market power.23 In the second stage, the
two manufacturers decide their prices for the components and the bundles. Mixed system makers
and retailers play a Bertrand game over a unit square in the last stage.
There are many potential mixed system makers and retailers of the original systems in the
industry. Thus, in the first stage, each manufacturer has the following four options: (1) to sell its
components to any mixed system makers and its bundles to any retailers; (2) to sell its components
to any mixed system makers and its bundles to one retailer; (3) to sell its components to one mixed
system maker for each XAB and XBA and its bundles to any retailers; (4) to sell its components
to one mixed system maker for each XAB and XBA and its bundles to one retailer.
A manufacturer can decide the market structure for its original system. If a manufacturer
sells its bundle to many retailers, they will have a Bertrand competition, pricing at the bundle
price. Those retailers are called competitive retailers in this chapter. If, instead, a manufacturer
sells its bundle to one retailer, it will be a local monopolist.
Unlike for the original system market, a manufacturer’s unilateral decision cannot determine
the market structure for the mixed systems. Both manufacturers’ simultaneous decisions jointly
determine the market structure. If both manufacturers sell their components to any mixed system
22Even if it takes positive costs to integrate mixed systems, it does not change the qualitative
aspects of the results. The rankings of the payoffs to the manufacturers corresponding to the
downstream market structures do not change in the integration costs.
23Since a mixed system needs the two manufacturers’ components, charging fees to a locally
monopolistic mixed system maker becomes a matter of bargaining. This chapter assumes for
simplicity that the same fee is charged to a mixed system maker by the two manufacturers. As
will be seen below, a locally monopolistic mixed system maker’ profits, and so the total fixed fees
charged to it, are very small. Thus, any changes in the solution to the bargaining game does not
affect the equilibrium of the whole game.
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makers, the mixed system makers will price their systems at marginal costs that are the sum of
the component prices. These mixed system makers are called competitive mixed system makers.
If the manufacturers decide to sell their components to only one and the same maker for each XAB
and XBA, the mixed system makers will have local monopoly power.24 They are called locally
monopolistic mixed system makers.
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits
This section presents the equilibrium prices and profits in the various downstream market structures
that result from the two manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage.25 Since each manufacturer has
four options, there are sixteen continuation games possible. However, several of these subgames
share the same equilibrium. For example, if a manufacturer sells its components to monopolistic
mixed-system makers while the other manufacturer sells to any mixed-system makers, then the
payoffs will be the same as when both manufacturers sell their components to monopolistic mixed-
system makers. This is because no one can produce mixed systems with only one manufacturer’s
components. Thus, the results from (a, c) are the same as (c, c) and the results from (b, d) are
the same as (d, d). In addition, the results from (b, c), (d, a) and (d, c) are the same. Therefore,
this section will focus the six subgames left which are summarized in the following table. Payoffs
pair (v)−1 is the payoffs pair (v) with manufacturer A and B’s payoffs interchanged.
2.3.1 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Competitive Retailers
Let us begin with the case when both manufacturers sell their components to many mixed system
makers and their bundles to any retailers in the first stage. Since every consumer’s reservation
price, C, is assumed to be high enough for the whole market to be covered, a consumer at (d1, d2)
24If the manufacturers decide to sell their components to different mixed system makers, no
system maker will be able to produce mixed systems, resulting in competition between the two
original systems. As stated in Chapter 2, these cases make the same result as in Matutes and
Regibeau (1988) and are not the focus of this paper.
25All the equilibrium prices, profits and demands are summarized in Appendix B.
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Manufacturer B
a) comp. mixed b) comp. mixed c) mono. mixed d) mono. mixed
comp. retailer mono. retailer comp. retailer mono. retailer
a) (i) (v) (iii) (vi)
A b) (v)−1 (ii) (vi) (iv)
c) (iii) (vi)−1 (iii) (vi)
d) (vi)−1 (iv) (vi)−1 (iv)
Table 2.1: Subgames
will purchase system XAA when the following inequalities hold:
PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ PAB + k(d1 + 1− d2);
PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ PBA + k(1− d1 + d2);
and PAA + k(d1 + d2) ≤ PBB + k(1− d1 + 1− d2).
Pij is the price for system Xij . The demand functions are obtained from those inequalities. DAA =
(k+PAB−PAA2k ) · (k+PBA−PAA2k )− 12 [(k+PBA−PAA2k )− (k−PAB+PBB2k )] · [(k+PAB−PAA2k )− (k−PBA+PBB2k )];
DBB = (1− k−PAB+PBB2k ) · (1− k−PBA+PBB2k )− 12 [(k+PBA−PAA2k )− (k−PAB+PBB2k )] · [(k+PAB−PAA2k )−
(k−PBA+PBB2k )]; DAB = (1− k+PAB−PAA2k ) · (k−PAB+PBB2k ); DBA = (1− k+PBA−PAA2k ) · (k−PBA+PBB2k ).
(See Figure 2.2.) Since the competitive mixed system makers and retailers price at their marginal
costs, PAA = RA; PBB = RB ; PAB = P1A + P2B ; PBA = P1B + P2A, where Ri is manufacturer i’s
bundle price and P1i and P2i are the prices for manufacturer i’s components 1 and 2, respectively.
From this reasoning, the equilibrium system prices and profits can be obtained from the two




fA (RA, P1A, P2A; P−A) = RADAA + P1ADAB + P2ADBA.
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Figure 2.2: Demands for the Systems
Manufacturer B has a similar profit maximization problem.
The resulting equilibrium prices PAA = PBB = RA = RB = 1.333k and P1A = P2A =
P1B = P2B = 0.917k. The profits for the manufacturers ΠupA = ΠupB = 0.698k and the demand
for mixed systems DAB = DBA = 0.0625. The results are the same as in Subsection 1.3.2 of
Chapter 1. In that subsection, the two manufacturers sell their systems directly to consumers,
selling their components to competitive mixed system makers. Since the competitive retailers’
prices are the same as the manufacturers’ bundle prices, the results are the same.
2.3.2 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Monopolistic Retailers
This subsection examines the case when each manufacturer sells its components to many mixed
system makers and its bundles to one retailer in the first stage. Since the consumers observe only
the system prices, the demand functions are the same as in the previous subsection. However, PAA
and PBB are decided differently. In the last stage, the two locally monopolistic retailers decide their
prices, maximizing their profits, (PAA−RA)DAA and (PBB −RB)DBB , respectively. Considering
the effects on the system prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in the second stage.
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Since the results from solving the last stage’s profit maximization problems are too complex
to be applied to the equilibrium calculation in the second stage, this essay uses the Implicit
Function Theorem.26 The resulting equilibrium prices PAA = PBB = 3.111k. RA = RB = 2.333k
and P1A = P2A = P1B = P2B = 1.722k. The profits for the manufacturers ΠupA = ΠupB = 1.290k
and for the locally monopolistic retailers ΠAA = ΠBB = 0.302k. The demand for mixed systems
DAB = DBA = 0.111.
Compared with the results in the previous subsection, monopolistic retailers give higher
profits to the manufacturers than competitive retailers. This advantage is from the less fierce
competition between the manufacturers’ bundles. Because of the local monopolists’ markups,
the original system markets shrink, shortening the border between the two markets. Moreover, a
manufacturer can not receive the full benefits from cutting its bundle price because its monopolistic
retailer will take some parts of the benefits from changing the retail price of the bundle. With the
fewer incentives to cut the bundle price, the two manufacturers face a less fierce competition and
can charge higher prices. As a result, mixed systems’ market share increases to 22% from the 13%
that results in the case of competitive mixed system makers and competitive retailers.
2.3.3 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Competitive Retailers
If the manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage are to sell the components to only one and the same
mixed system maker for each XAB and XBA, the system makers will work as local monopolists.
They will choose their mixed system prices to maximize their profits, (Pij − P1i − P2j)Dij , in the
third stage. Considering these mixed system prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in
the second stage. The manufacturers’ profit functions are the same as in subsection 3.1.
This case shares the same results with Subsection 1.3.3 in Chapter 1 because the competitive
retailers’ prices are the same as the manufacturers’ bundle prices. From the profit maximization
problems of the mixed system makers and the manufacturers, PAA = PBB = RA = RB = 1.2k,
26For a detailed explanation, see Appendix A.1.
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P1A = P2A = P1B = P2B = 0.85k and PAB = PBA = 1.867k. The profits for the manufacturers
ΠupA = ΠupB = 0.614k and for the locally monopolistic mixed system makers ΠAB = ΠBA =
0.005k. The demand for the mixed systems DAB = DBA = 0.028.
2.3.4 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Monopolistic Retailers
With all the four systems sold by local monopolists, the system prices Pij are decided to maximize
(Pij − P1i − P2j)Dij and Pii to maximize (Pii − Ri)Dii in the last stage. Considering the effects
on these prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in the second stage.
With the same method as in Subsection 2.3.2, the resulting equilibrium prices PAA =
PBB = 3.050k. RA = RB = 2.189k and P1A = P2A = P1B = P2B = 1.629k. The profits for the
manufacturers ΠupA = ΠupB = 1.169k, for the locally monopolistic retailers ΠAA = ΠBB = 0.371k
and for the locally monopolistic mixed system makers ΠAB = ΠAB = 0.018k. The demand for
mixed systems DAB = DBA = 0.07.
Monopolistic retailers give higher profits to the manufacturers than competitive retailers as
in Subsection 2.3.2. However, this advantage created by the monopolistic retailers is reduced by
the disadvantage created by the monopolistic mixed system makers. This disadvantage is similar
to that in Subsection 1.3.3 in the previous chapter. The locally monopolistic mixed system makers’
markups make the mixed system markets shrink, lengthening the border between the markets for
the manufacturers’ original systems. The manufacturers become more aggressive in their pricing,
resulting in more fierce competition and lower profits.
2.3.5 Competitive Mixed System Makers and Asymmetric Retailers
This subsection analyzes the case where a manufacturer, say manufacturer A, sells its bundles to
a monopolistic retailer and its components to competitive mixed system makers, while the other
manufacturer, say manufacturer B, sells its bundles and components to competitive retailers and
mixed system makers. In this situation, PBB = RB ; PAB = P1A + P2B ; PBA = P1B + P2A but
PAA is decided to maximize (PAA − RA)DAA in the last stage. Considering the effects on these
prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in the second stage.
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Since there are too many equations to solve, a numerical analysis is used to obtain the
equilibrium prices.27 The resulting equilibrium price PAA = 2.357k, PBB = RB = 2.198k. RA =
1.561k. PAB = PAB = 2.720k from P1A = P2A = 0.601k and P1B = P2B = 2.119k. The profits
for the manufacturers ΠupA = 0.664k and ΠupB = 1.380k and for the locally monopolistic retailer
of XAA, ΠAA = 0.292k. The demands for mixed systems DAB = DBA = 0.076, for system XAA,
DAA = 0.367 and for system XBB , DBB = 0.481.
It is surprising that manufacturer A’s bundle price, RA = 1.561k is higher than the sum
of its component prices P1A + P2A = 1.202k.28 Manufacturer A is not aggressive in bundle
pricing because it can not take the full benefits from cutting its bundle price. On the contrary,
manufacturer B is aggressive in its bundle pricing because it does not lose the benefits from cutting
its bundle price to anyone. These incentives are combined to result in A’s bundle price high relative
to its component prices and B’s bundle price low relative to its component prices. Manufacturer B’s
bundle price, RB = 2.198k, is very close to the price of its one component, P1B = P2B = 2.119k.
2.3.6 Monopolistic Mixed System Makers and Asymmetric Retailers
This subsection analyzes the case where all players in the last stage are local monopolists except the
retailers of XBB . Manufacturer A sells its bundles to a monopolistic retailer and its components to
monopolistic mixed system makers, while manufacturer B sells its bundles to competitive retailers
and its components to monopolistic mixed system makers. Now, Pij are decided to maximize
(Pij − P1i − P2j)Dij and PAA to maximize (PAA − RA)DAA. But, PBB = RB . Considering the
effects on these prices, the two manufacturers decide their prices in the second stage.
A numerical analysis is used to obtain the equilibrium prices.29 The resulting equilibrium
27For a detailed explanation, see Appendix C.
28It should be noted that manufacturer A receives the fixed fees in addition to the bundle price.
29Calculation of the equilibrium also used the method of applying the Implicit Function Theorem.
For a detailed explanation, see Appendix C.
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price PAA = 2.301k, PBB = RB = 2.105k. RA = 1.448k. PAB = PAB = 2.806k. P1A =
P2A = 0.509k and P1B = P2B = 2.111k. The profits for the manufacturers ΠupA = 0.594k and
ΠupB = 1.296k and for the locally monopolistic retailer of XAA, ΠAA = 0.328k. The profits for
the monopolistic mixed system makers, ΠAB = ΠBA = 0.007k. The demand for mixed systems
DAB = DBA = 0.037, for system XAA, DAA = 0.385 and for system XBB , DBB = 0.542.
The results in this case are similar to those in the previous subsection as the results in
subsections 3.3 and 3.4 are similar to those in 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Monopolistic mixed system
makers bring more fierce competition between the original systems. The equilibrium prices, profits
and demands for mixed systems are lower than with competitive mixed system makers. As in the
previous subsection, manufacturer A’s bundle price, RA = 1.448k is higher than the sum of its
component prices, P1A + P2A = 1.018k. Note that by the introduction of the monopolistic mixed
system makers, manufacturer B’s market share increases from 48.1% to 54.2%. This is because
manufacturer B, with its competitive retailers, can control more easily the consumer price of its
original system.
Another interesting result is that manufacturer B’s bundle price, RB = 2.105k is lower than
the price of its one component, P1B = P2B = 2.111k. It can be an explanation for this surprising
result that now manufacturer B is more aggressive in its bundle pricing than with competitive
mixed system makers, because some parts of the benefits from cutting its component prices are
lost to the locally monopolistic mixed system makers. Compared with the case of competitive
mixed system makers, manufacturer B’s bundle price is now 4.2% lower, while its component price
is 0.4% lower.
However, manufacturer A is still aggressive in its component pricing. Its component price
decreases 15.3%, while its bundle price decreases 7.2%. Though manufacturer A loses some parts
of the benefits from cutting its component prices like manufacturer B, using component prices to
attack B’s market is more attractive to A. This is from the asymmetric situation. With higher
market share of XBB , the markets for XAB and XBA are rectangles not squares. If manufacturer
A cuts its component price, its effect is larger on DBB than on DAA. Since the introduction of
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the monopolistic mixed system makers increases manufacturer B’s market share and manfuacturer
B is more aggressive in bundle pricing, the difference in the effects on DBB and DAA is larger,
inducing manufacturer A more aggressive in its component pricing.
Figure 2.3: Effects of a Decrease in Manufacturer A’s Component 1
2.4 Equilibrium Downstream Market Structure
In this section, we consider the two manufacturers’ decisions in the first stage. From the analysis up
to now, we can fill out the payoff matrix which the two manufacturers face in the first stage. Each
payoffs are not only the manufacturer’s profits but also include the profits of the monopolistic
retailers, if any, and half of the profits of the monopolistic mixed system makers, if any. Each
number should be read as a ratio over k.
The pure strategy Nash equilibria, (b,b) and (d,d), can be easily found from the above
payoff matrix. The equilibrium downstream market structure requires locally monopolistic retailers
whether the mixed system makers are competitive or locally monopolistic. Note that (b,b) is the
unique Nash equilibrium that survives the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. (b,b)
is also the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium.
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Manufacturer B
a) comp. mixed b) comp. mixed c) mono. mixed d) mono. mixed
comp. retailer mono. retailer comp. retailer mono. retailer
a) (0.698, 0.698) (1.380, 0.956) (0.619, 0.619) (1.303, 0.929)
A b) (0.956, 1.380) (1.593, 1.593) (0.929, 1.303) (1.558, 1.558)
c) (0.619, 0.619) (1.303, 0.929) (0.619, 0.619) (1.303, 0.929)
d) (0.929, 1.303) (1.558, 1.558) (0.929, 1.303) (1.558, 1.558)
Table 2.2: Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers
2.5 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare
This section compares consumer surplus and social welfare, the joint profits and consumer surplus,
in each downstream market structure. The table below summarizes the consumer surplus and the
social welfare in the six cases of downstream market structure and social planner’s.
Downstream Market Structures CS SW
Competitive Mixed and Competitive Retailers C − 1.979k C − 0.583k
Competitive Mixed and Monopolistic Retailers C − 3.728k C − 0.543k
Monopolistic Mixed and Competitive Retailers C − 1.860k C − 0.623k
Monopolistic Mixed and Monopolistic Retailers C − 3.692k C − 0.576k
Competitive Mixed and Asymmetric Retailers C − 2.914k C − 0.578k
Monopolistic Mixed and Asymmetric Retailers C − 2.857k C − 0.625k
Social Planner - C − 0.5k
Table 2.3: Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare in Each Downstream Market Structure
In this model, C, the reservation price common to all the consumers distributed in a unit
square, is the maximum value for consumer surplus or social welfare. Since a consumer buying
one unit of system Xij has a utility of C − k(d1i + d2j) − Pij , consumer surplus decreases in
transportation costs and system prices. Consumer surplus is the lowest when the mixed systems
are provided competitively and the retailers are locally monopolistic. This is because in this case
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the two manufacturers can charge the highest prices. For a similar reason, consumer surplus is the
highest when the mixed system providers are locally monopolistic and the original system retailers
are competitive.
Unlike consumer surplus, social welfare does not depend on the system prices. Social welfare
in this model depends only on transportation costs. To minimize these transportation costs, the
social planner assigns a quarter of the market to each of the four systems. From the perspective of
the social planner, all the four systems are equally valuable. The competition between the bundles
places lower prices on the bundles than their socially desirable level. When the manufacturers’
bundles face less fierce competition, the bundle price is closer to its socially desirable level. Since
the competitive mixed system makers and monopolistic retailers make the competition least fierce,
they also bring the highest social welfare.
Note that asymmetric retailers bring lower social welfare even with higher mixed system
market shares. Monopolistic mixed system makers and asymmetric retailers result in 7.4% mixed
system market share, while monopolistic mixed system makers and competitive retailers result in
5.6% mixed system market share. However, asymmetric retailers with monopolistic mixed system
makers bring the lowest social welfare. As stated earlier, the markets for the mixed systems are
rectangular. With the linear transportation costs, rectangles are less efficient than squares.
2.6 Conclusion
The results of this chapter can be summarized by the intuition that duopolistic manufacturers
can benefit from locally monopolistic retailers of their original systems, because the monopolistic
retailers lessen the competition between their original systems.
A crucially important assumption behind these results is that the reservation price common
to all the consumers is high enough for the whole market to be covered. It can be a topic for
further research to analyze the equilibrium in the cases where the reservation price is not high
enough.
There are more areas for modification or extension of the model. A modification of the
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model by introducing a Cournot game in the downstream markets will be interesting. A more




Strategic Abandoning of Market Power in System Markets
3.1 Introduction
Creating and defending market power is an important business strategy. This chapter finds,
however, that in system markets, it may be profitable for a duopolist to give up its market position
in one component market.
To show this strategic abandoning of market power, this chapter models competition between
duopolistic manufacturers who produce two complementary components, hardware and software,
with many potential hardware providers.30 In this situation, an integrated manufacturer may
want to abandon its duopolistic position in hardware market if this leads new entrants to hard-
ware market to adopt its software, and the loss from giving up the duopolistic position in the
hardware market is less than the gains from the increased market share for software. When the
potential hardware providers are infinitely many, the integrated manufacturer becomes virtually
disintegrated.
Though both the duopolists may want to choose this strategy, it is also possible that the
best response to the rival’s strategic abandoning of the hardware market is to keep the duopolis-
tic position in both component markets. This is because when the duopolists both give up the
hardware market, their software market shares remain the same as if they kept their duopolistic
positions in both component markets. If the costs for making their software compatible with the
new entrants’ hardware are high, the equilibrium is asymmetric.
The manufacturer’s incentive to abandon market power can help us to better understand the
current horizontal competition model in the computer industry. Competition is between component
manufacturers under this horizontal model, while companies make the vast majority of components
in-house and sell a complete package to the customer under the traditional vertical integration
30The two components are the same in every aspect except that there are many potential
providers of one component. Hardware is picked as that component because many hardware
providers reflect the actual market structure.
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model.31 It is said that the winners of the horizontal model are the manfuacturers that have a
large, and usually dominant, market share within a horizontal layer. For example, Microsoft (MS)
is the winner in the operating system layer. According to the findings in this chapter, however,
its success depends on the existence of many hardware providers who adopt MS operating system.
This research suggests that if MS uses its market power in the OS market to enter and dominate
the hardware market, its almost monopolistic status in the OS market could be damaged.32
Another interesting question is related to Apple. It cannot be included in the horizontal
competition model because it provides most components in house that are not compatible with
other companies’ components. Considering the dominant status of MS operating systems and
IBM compatible computer platforms, it has been questioned why Apple has survived so long. The
asymmetric equilibrium found in this chapter can provide an answer to this question. Apple’s
incompatible systems may be its best strategy against its rivals, MS and many IBM compatible
computer platform makers. On the other hand, in this asymmetric equilibrium, MS does not
want to enter the hardware market because its entrance may take away its dominant status in the
software market.
Section 2 reviews closely related literature. The basic model is presented in Section 3.
Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium when the reservation price common to all the consumers is
high. Comparative statics are in Section 5. Section 6 suggests some conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
The most closely related literature with this chapter is Matutes and Regibeau (1988). The model
in this chapter is a modified version of their model. Following them, this chapter explicitly modeled
31Yoffie (1997) and Andrew Grove (1993), CEO of Intel, argued that the traditional vertical
integration adopted by manufacturers has been replaced by the horizontal model in the computer
industry. For related figures, see Appendix D.
32Microsoft has been blamed for using its market power in the OS market to enter and dominate
other markets for word processing or spread sheet programs. Since hardware also has complemen-
tarity with software, it is puzzling why MS does not enter the hardware market.
43
a system as a set of components instead of treating it as a single good as in Katz and Shapiro
(1985) or Farrell and Saloner (1985). Since Matutes and Regibeau’s focus was to examine two
manufacturers’ incentives to produce products compatible with each other, they did not tackle
explicitly the issue of component competition versus system competition. In addition, they cannot
explain the different structures of the component markets. There is no asymmetric equilibrium of
a system provider versus component providers in their model.
Farrell, Monroe and Saloner (1998)’s focus is similar to this chapter’s. However, they did
not explicitly model the choice of the competition style and so their findings are about biases
towards component competition or system competition. In addition, their model does not have an
asymmetric equilibrium. They just pointed out that the Apple personal computer was an exception
to the general trend towards component competition.
Conner (1995) shares similar insight with this chapter. She examined an innovator’s best
strategy when there are network externalities. In her model, an innovator invents a technology and
then is faced with the decision of how to commercialize it. The innovator may choose either to be
the sole seller of the product based on its new technology, or to share that technology with another
manufacturer(s) that is invited to produce a clone of the innovator’s product. She suggests the
innovator may choose to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present.
Though the basic insight is similar to this chapter’s, this chapter analyzes the issue in the system
market, and thus, the manufacturers have different incentives to give up their market positions.
Moreover, in her model, clone products should be modeled to be inferior compared to the original
in order for the cloning strategy to be profitable.
Farrell and Gallini (1988) analyze the same issue as Conner (1995), that is, the new prod-
uct monopolist’s incentive to license its technology, although they are different in spirit. When
consumers incur setup costs, the monopolist may face ”a dynamic consistency problem: the mo-
nopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs.” Then,
second-sourcing can be used as a way to make a commitment to competition in the future. ”The
technology is given away but with a lag,” while the technology is given away but with a dete-
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rioration in Conner (1995). As is the case with Conner’s model, this model cannot be directly
applied to the case of duopolists. However, incorporating the dynamic consistency problem into
the duopolists’ competition in system markets will be an interesting research topic.
Nalebuff (2000) uses a model similar to this chapter, to show a contrary insight: a firm that
sells a bundle of complementary products will have a substantial advantage over rivals who sell
the component products individually. However, his model cannot explain why MS does not enter
the hardware market, even though hardware also has complementarity with software. A combined
model of Nalebuff (2000) and this chapter may explain that a duopolist will benefit by bundling
a subset of the components with the help of many providers of the component excluded from the
bundle.
3.3 Model
A system is composed of two components, hardware and software. Each component is produced at
zero marginal cost (MC), and there are no economies of scope. Though there are infinitely many
potential hardware manufacturers along the line [0,1],33 only two manufacturers, A and B, can
produce both the components. Since an incompatible hardware is useless to the consumer, the two
manufacturers can determine the market structure.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit square (see Figure 3.1), where manufacturer
A is located at the origin, while manufacturer B is located at (1,1). Every consumer can mix and
match any components costlessly, only if they are compatible. A consumer located at (d1, d2) has
his/her ideal first component that is d1 away from manufacturer A’s first component and his/her
ideal second component that is d2 away from A’s second component. Similarly, the distances
between the consumer’s preferred point and manufacturer B’s components are 1− d1 and 1− d2,
33Another possible interpretation is assuming that the two incumbent manufacturers can pub-
licize their hardware technology, instead of assuming many potential hardware manufacturers. If
any manufacturer makes public its hardware technology to make its own clones, new entrants may
enter the hardware market and decide their location at any point between [0,1]. It can be thought
of as a modified extension of Conner (1995)’s model to the case of duopolists.
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respectively.
Figure 3.1: Locations of Manufacturers and Consumers on the Unit Square
A consumer buying one unit of system Xij has a surplus of C − k(d1i + d2j) − Pij , where
C is the reservation price common to all the consumers and parameter k measures the degree
of horizontal product differentiation between the two manufacturers’ goods. dij is the distance
between the consumer’s ideal ith component and firm j’s. Pij is the total price of the system
composed of component 1 by firm i and component 2 by firm j. Each consumer buys the two
components in the fixed proportion of one unit of good 1 and each unit of good 2. Every consumer
purchases at most one unit of the system.
The whole game is a three-stage game. In the first stage of the game, each manufacturer
decides whether to be the producer of its own proprietary systems or the provider of software
compatible with every hardware. In the following stage, each manufacturer announce its price. If
no manufacturer decided to make its software compatible, the game ends. If any manufacturer
chose to provide compatible software, then there will be a Bertrand game among new entrants in
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the third stage.
It is costly to make software to be compatible with hardware. This model assumes that
the incumbent manufacturer pays fixed costs, F, to make their software compatible with the new
entrants to the hardware market. The new entrants to the hardware market are ready to produce
their hardware, without any additional costs.34
3.4 Equilibrium When C Is High
The equilibrium depends on the level of the reservation price C relative to the product differenti-
ation parameter k. This section considers the case when C is big enough for the whole market to
be covered.
3.4.1 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Both Manufacturers Sell Incompatible Systems
Let’s first consider the case when the two manufacturers sell incompatible systems.35 A consumer
located at (d1, d2) will purchase the system from manufacturer A rather than from manufacturer
B if PA +k(d1 +d2)PB +k(2−d2), where Pi is the price of manufacturer i’s system. For PA ≥ PB ,




PA · [1 + PB − PA2k ]
2,




Maximizing profits with respect to PA and PB respectively yields P ∗i = k, and thus Πi =
1
2k. The two manufacturers have the same market share of
1
2 . (See Figure 3.2.) This is valid
34If some costs are assumed for the entrance to the hardware market, the number of entrants will
be limited. Though this is a more realistic assumption, infinitely many hardware providers were
assumed because both may reach similar results and infinitely many hardware providers make the
equilibrium calculation much simpler.
35It is exactly the same as the “ direct competitors’ case” in the Matutes-Regibeau model.
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solution as long as the whole market is served at equilibrium prices, i.e., as long as C−P ∗i −k ≥ 0,
or C ≥ 2k.
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Market Configuration When Both Manufacturers Sell Incompatible Sys-
tems
3.4.2 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Only One Manufacturer Sells Compatible Software
When manufacturer A chose to give up profits from its hardware component market and to make
its software compatible with every other hardware, all the consumers of software A are able to
choose their ideal hardware. In addition, every new entrant’s hardware price will be the marginal
cost that is zero.36 Thus, a consumer located at (d1, d2) will purchase the system of manufacturer
A’s software and a new entrant’s hardware rather than of manufacturer B, if PAS + k · d2 ≤





2k − kd1 − PAS + PB
2k











36For a proof, see Appendix E.
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6k, and ΠAS =
49
72k − F and ΠB = 2572k, respectively. Manufacturer A’s market share is 712 and Manufacturer B’s
5
12 . (See Figure 3.3.) As in the previous subsection, these equilibrium prices are valid as long as
C ≥ 2k.
Note that manufacturer A’s price is higher than B’s price even though A’s market share
is bigger than B’s. The increased variety of hardware enables manufacturer A to enjoy both
high price and bigger market share. As another result, absent the fixed cost F , the sum of both
manufacturers’ profits is greater than k, the total profits when there are only manufacturer A and
B’s systems.
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Market Configuration When Only One Manufacturer Sells Compatible
Software
3.4.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits When Both Manufacturers Sell Compatible Software
If both manufacturers make their software compatible with every hardware, each consumer can
purchase his/her ideal hardware type without any related costs. In this case also, every new
entrant’s hardware price will be the zero marginal cost. A consumer located at (d1, d2) will be
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indifferent between the software of manufacturer A and B if PAS + k · d2 = PBS + k(1− d2). This
case boils down to a typical Hotelling game. Solving this game results in P ∗i = k, and Πi =
1
2k−F .
The two manufacturers have the same market share of 12 . (See Figure 3.4.) This solution is valid
as long as C − P ∗i − k ≥ 0, or C ≥ 2k.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Market Configuration When Both Manufacturers Sell Compatible Software
3.4.4 Equilibrium of the Whole Game
The analysis up to now shows that the two manufacturers will face the payoff matrix below in the
first stage.
Manufacturer B
Compatible Software Incompatible System
Manufacturer A Compatible Software ( 12k − F, 12k − F ) ( 4972k − F, 2572k)
Incompatible System ( 2572k,
49
72k − F ) ( 12k, 12k)
Table 3.1: Matrix of Payoffs to the Manufacturers
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The equilibrium of the whole game depends on the relative magnitude of F . When F >
13
72k, both manufacturers will not give up their hardware markets. If
11
72k < F <
13
72k, only one
manufacturer will make its software compatible with every hardware. With F less than 1172k, both
manufacturers will choose to sell compatible software. There are no mixed strategy equilibria when
F > 1372k, since “ Compatible Software” strategy is strictly dominated. F less than
11
72k also makes
“ Incompatible System” strategy strictly dominated. When 1172k < F <
13
72k, a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists and the related probability is 132 k − 36Fk . The higher the magnitude of F
within this range, the less probability will be given to the “ Compatible Software” strategy.
The strategy of making its software compatible with every hardware has costs and benefits.
One of the costs is the lost profits from giving up its own hardware market. The other costs are
the fixed costs F . The benefits are from the increased demands for its software. The equilibrium
depends on the relative magnitude of these costs and benefits.
3.5 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare
This section compares consumer surplus and social welfare, the joint profits and consumer surplus,
in each case. The table below summarizes the consumer surplus and the social welfare in the three
cases.
CS SW
Both Incompatible Systems37 C − 53k C − 23k − F
Asymmetric Case38 C − 5336k C − 49k − F
Both Compatible Software39 C − 54k C − 14k − F
Table 3.2: Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare in Each Case
Prediction of the results is not difficult. The introduction of infinitely many hardware makers
make the consumer surplus higher. Though the software provider in the asymmetric case charges
a high price, that effect is less than the effect of the infinitely many hardware types. The ranking
of the social welfare is the same.
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3.6 Comparative statics
This section considers the changes in the equilibrium when the reservation price, C, is not high
enough for the whole market to be covered. There are two sub-cases: (1) C is so low that each
manufacturer’s market does not touch the other’s; (2) C is in intermediate levels.
3.6.1 Equilibrium When C is Very Low
If C is so low that each manufacturer’s market does not touch the other’s, each manufacturer will
behave as a local monopolist.
Let’s consider the case where each manufacturer provides incompatible system. Manufac-
turer A will serve the consumers whose utility from purchasing A’s system, C − k(d1 + d2)− PA,





with respect to PA yields
P ∗A =
1
3C and ΠA =
2C3
27k2 . This is a valid solution if the manufacturers’ markets do not overlap
at the equilibrium prices, i.e. if C − k − 13C < 0 or C < 32k.
Otherwise, if each manufacturer makes its software compatible with every hardware, its





)−F with respect to PAS yields P ∗AS = 12C, and ΠAS = C
2
4k −F when C is less than
or equal to 2k. This solution is valid as long as the manufacturers’ markets do not touch each
other’s, i.e. C − 12k − 12C < 0 or C < k.
Note that when C is sufficiently low, there is no asymmetric equilibrium to the whole game
such that one manufacturer provides incompatible system and the other manufacturer provides
compatible software. This is because if C is less than or equal to k, the two manufacturers behave
like monopolists. Since the two manufacturers are symmetric, both manufacturers will make the
same choice concerning compatibility.
Since low C does not bring about an asymmetric equilibrium, the relative magnitude of F
decides the changes in the equilibrium when C increases. Suppose, for example, that 1172k < F <
13
72k. In this case, the manufacturers will choose to provide incompatible systems when C is very
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low.40 However, these manufacturers’ choices will make an asymmetric equilibrium when C is
greater than 2k.41 Thus, higher market demands42 can result in asymmetric equilibrium between
the two manufacturers, while they choose incompatible systems when market demands are low.
If F > 1372k, on the contrary, the two manufacturers will choose to provide incompatible systems
regardless of the values for C.
3.6.2 Equilibrium When C is in Intermediate Levels
In this case, the two manufacturers will set the price so that consumer surplus is zero on the market
boundary. The range of C is 23k < C < 2k for the manufacturers of incompatible systems. Each
manufacturer will price Pi = 2C − 2k − Pj so that P ∗i = C − k and Πi = 12 (C − k).43
The range of C for the manufacturers of compatible software is k < C < 32k. Each manu-
facturer will set its price, P ∗i = C− 12k so that Πi = 12 (C− 12k)−F .44 The table below summarizes
the equilibrium prices and profits according to the value of C relative to k.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has considered whether and when it is profitable for a duopolist in system markets to
give up its market position. In industries where components have strong complementarity with each
other, an integrated manufacturer may want to abandon its duopolistic position in one component




27k2 with C less than
or equal to k. However, F > 1172k is too big for the local monopolists to prefer compatibility on
net.
41From Section 3.4, we know that the equilibrium is asymmetric for 1172k < F <
13
72k.
42In this model, the magnitude of C relative to k is the only exogenous variable which decides
market demands.
43The equilibrium described here is the symmetric one. There are also continuum of asymmetric
equilibria. These asymmetric equilibria result from the fact that the two manufacturers are at
the kink point of the demand curve in this situation. As often occurs, there can exist multiple
equilibria.
44There are also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria.
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Both incompatible systems Both compatible software
Price Profits Price Profits







K < C < 32k C − 12k 12 (C − 12k)− F
3
2k < C < 2k C − k 12 (C − k)
2k < C k 12k k
1
2k − F
Table 3.3: Equilibrium Prices and Profits When C Is Not High
market if this leads new entrants to the component market to adopt its other component, and the
loss from giving up the duopolistic position in one component market is less than the gains from
the increased market share of the other component market.
Another main finding is the asymmetric equilibrium in which one duopolist gives up its
market power in one component market and the other duopolist retains its market powers in both
component markets. This asymmetric equilibrium can be summarized as the competition over a
unit square between a firm at a point and firms on a line. A firm at a point can survive in spite
of pressures from firms on a line, a set of infinitely many points, because they are competing in a
square with positive transportation costs.
There are various areas for modification or extension of the model in this chapter. An
interesting one will be a combined model of Nalebuff (2000) and this chapter. It will be able to
explain the issue of the merits of bundling versus the merits of strategic abandoning of market
power in some component markets.
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Appendix A
When All System Prices Are Set Later Than Component Prices
Under this alternative scenario, four system prices, two for original and two for mixed systems,
are decided in the last stage. However, solving four simultaneous equations for the four prices
is not easy. For example, Mathematica 4.1 is not able to do this calculation. This difficulty is
from the fact that the symmetry condition should not be imposed on the FOC’s in the last stage.
The Implicit Function Theorem enables us to go around this problem. The following subsection
describes the methods used in the equilibrium calculation. Subsection 8.2 reports the results.
A.1 Methods in calculating the equilibrium
Consider the case with locally monopolistic TPCIs first. In the last stage, FOC’s for the profit
maximization problems will be the following:
∂ΠA
∂PAA


































































Let y denote (PAA, PBB , PAB , PBA) and x denote (PA1, PA2, PB1, PB2). If the 4× 4 matrix
∂F
∂y evaluated at (x
∗, y∗) is nonsingular, there exist functions PAA = PAA(x), PBB = PBB(x),
PAB = PAB(x), PBA = PBA(x) defined on a ball ß about x∗. Furthermore, we can compute ∂y∂x at
(x∗, y∗) by totally differentiating the above equations and solving the resulting system.






























































which are evaluated at (x∗, y∗). Manufacturer B’s problem is similar. Thus, there are four equations
and eight variables. With the symmetry conditions, the four equations are the same. Since the
FOC’s in the last stage should also be satisfied on the equilibrium path, solving the FOC’s in the
second and last stages will produce the equilibrium prices and profits. Now, imposing symmetry
conditions on the FOC’s in the last stage does not pose any problems. The resulting solutions
might include Nash equilibria which are not SPNE. However, the resulting solutions should include
SPNE.
There are multiple solutions to the above simultaneous equations. The equilibrium prices
and profits reported in the next subsection are the unique ones that survive the following tests:
(1) Excluding complex numbers;
(2) Applying SOC’s at the last stage;
(3) Removing the solutions that make the market share of a mixed system vanish to zero
or negative.










(mono.TPCI), zI ≤ 0.11k or zI ≥ 0.98k
However, PAA (comp.TPCI)


















ΠAA (comp.TPCI) > ΠAA (subsidiaries) > ΠAA (mono.TPCI), zI ≤ 0.62k or zI ≥ 0.98k
ΠAA (subsidiaries) > ΠAA (comp.TPCI) > ΠAA (mono.TPCI) for 0.63k ≤ zI ≤ 0.97k
However, ΠAA (comp.TPCI)
.= ΠAA (subsidiaries) for 0 ≤ zI ≤ k
Consumer Surplus:
CS (mono.TPCI) > CS (subsidiaries)
.= CS (comp.TPCI)
Social Welfare:
SW (comp.TPCI) > SW (subsidiaries) > SW (mono.TPCI) for 0 ≤ zI ≤ 0.67k
SW (mono.TPCI) > SW (subsidiaries) > SW (comp.TPCI) for 0.68k ≤ zI ≤ k
When 0.98k ≤ zI , the competition between two manufacturers with monopolistic TPCIs is
the same as the competition between two incompatible systems. As in Section 3, higher integration
costs or local monopoly in providing mixed system prices make the competition between original
systems fiercer, resulting in lower original system prices.
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Appendix B
Summary of the Equilibrium in Chapter 2
(i) competitive mixed system makers and competitive retailers
(ii) competitive mixed system makers and monopolistic retailers
(iii) monopolistic mixed system makers and competitive retailers
(iv) monopolistic mixed system makers and monopolistic retailers
(v) competitive mixed system makers and asymmetric retailers
(vi) monopolistic mixed system makers and asymmetric retailers
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
System Prices
PAA 1.333k 3.111k 1.200k 3.050k 2.357k 2.301k
PBB 1.333k 3.111k 1.200k 3.050k 2.198k 2.105k
PAB = PBA 1.833k 3.444k 1.867k 3.522k 2.720k 2.806k
Component Prices
A 0.917k 1.722k 0.850k 1.629k 0.601k 0.509k
B 0.917k 1.722k 0.850k 1.629k 2.119k 2.111k
Bundle Prices
A 1.333k 2.333k 1.200k 2.189k 1.561k 1.448k
B 1.333k 2.333k 1.200k 2.189k 2.198k 2.105k
Profits
ΠupA 0.698k 1.290k 0.614k 1.169k 0.664k 0.594k
ΠupB 0.698k 1.290k 0.614k 1.169k 1.380k 1.296k
ΠAA 0 0.302k 0 0.371k 0.292k 0.328k
ΠAB = ΠBA 0 0 0.005k 0.018k 0 0.007k
Demands
DAA 0.437k 0.389k 0.472k 0.430k 0.367k 0.385k
DBB 0.437k 0.389k 0.472k 0.430k 0.481k 0.542k
DAB = DBA 0.063k 0.111k 0.028k 0.070k 0.076k 0.037k
CS* −1.979k −3.728k −1.860k −3.692k −2.914k −2.857k
SW* −0.583k −0.543k −0.623k −0.576k −0.578k −0.625k
* The numbers for CS and SW are deductions from C.
Table B.1: Summary of the Equilibrium in Chapter 2
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Appendix C
Numerical Equilibrium Calculation in Cases of Asymmetric Retailers
To calculate the equilibrium in the case of asymmetric retailers, ”FindRoot” command in Math-
ematica 4.1 is used to obtain the solutions for the FOC’s in the second stage. Various starting
points are tested because ”FindRoot” stops when it finds one solution. 14, 112 sets of the starting
points are tested in the case of competitive mixed system makers and asymmetric retailers: 6
points (2.3k ∼ 4.8k by 0.5k) for PAA; 7 points (1.5k ∼ 4.5k) for RA; 8 points (0.6k ∼ 4.1k) for P1A
and P2A; 7 points (2.1k ∼ 5.1k) for RB ; 6 points (2.1k ∼ 4.6k) for P1B and P2B . In the case of
monopolistic mixed system makers and asymmetric retailers, 63, 504 sets of the starting points are
tested: 6 points (2.3k ∼ 4.8k by 0.5k) for PAA; 6 points (2.8k ∼ 5.3k) for PAB and PBA; 7 points
(1.4k ∼ 4.4k) for RA; 7 points (0.5k ∼ 3.5k) for P1A and P2A; 6 points (2.1k ∼ 4.6k) for RB ; 6
points (2.1k ∼ 4.6k) for P1B and P2B . The equilibrium prices in Subsections 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 are
the only sets of the solutions that survive the following tests: (1) excluding complex or negative
numbers; (2) applying SOC’s at the last stage; (3) removing the solutions that make any system’s
market share to be negative.
”FindMinimum” command, a gradient-based optimization tool, is used to check whether the
solutions obtained above are correct. In the case of competitive mixed system makers and asymmet-
ric retailers, ”FindMinimum” is used to seek for the local minimum of each manufacturer’s profit
function, given the other manufacturer’s prices. Since the minimum found by ”FindMinimum” is
not guaranteed to be a global one, 1, 331 sets of the starting points are tested: 11 points (0 ∼ 5.0k
by 0.5k) for each Ri, P1i and P2i. In addition, ”NMinimize” with ”RandomSearch” Method, a
numerical tool for global optimization, is used to check the validity of the solutions. The optimum
values and optimizing prices found by these two methods are the same as the equilibrium profits
and prices obtained above. However, in the case of monopolistic mixed system makers and asym-
metric retailers, ”FindMinimum” and ”NMinimize” are not used since the explicit solutions for
PAA, PAB and PBA are not obtained.
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Appendix D
“Old” and “New” Market Structures in Computer Industry
A. The “old” computer industry45:
B. The 1995 computer industry46:
45Adapted from Intel documents and The Economist. Cited again from Yoffie (1997).
46Adapted from Intel documents; The Economist; and Department of Defense, Building U.S.
Capabilities in Flat Panel Displays (October 1994). Cited again from Yoffie (1997).
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Appendix E
Pricing of New Entrants to the Hardware Market
Proposition 8 When a manufacturer chooses to make its software compatible with every other
hardware, every new entrant’s hardware price should go to the marginal cost. (Necessary Condition)
Proof:
Suppose a situation where a hardware maker makes positive profits by pricing Pi > MC
and Qi(Pi) > 0. In this situation, if a new hardware maker comes in to hardware maker i’s
market and sets its price equal to Pi, it will also make positive profits. Therefore, in equilibrium,
(Pi −MC) ·Qi(Pi) should go to zero for every i.
There are seven possibilities:
(1) Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) > 0 for every i;
(2) Pi > MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for every i;
(3) Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for every i;
(4) Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) > 0 for some i’s, and Pi > MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for the others;
(5) Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) > 0 for some i’s, and Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for the others;
(6) Pi > MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for some i’s, and Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for the others.
(7) Pi → MC, Qi(Pi) > 0 for some i’s, Pi > MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for other i’s, and Pi → MC,
Qi(Pi) → 0 for the others.
Consider a situation where a hardware maker prices at MC and its demand is strictly
greater than zero. Since the hardware maker’s demand is continuous, if it raises its price, it will
get positive profits. Thus (1), (4), (5) and (7) cannot be an equilibrium.
Consider the second situation where Pi > MC, Qi(Pi) → 0 for every i. In that situation
a hardware maker can steal its neighbor hardware makers’ markets by lowering its price and get
positive profits. Hence, case (2) cannot be an equilibrium, either.
Case (6) has various sub-cases. If, in some sub-cases, hardware makers in an area price
strictly higher than MC, those sub-cases cannot be an equilibrium for the same reason as in case
(2).
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The rest is cases (3) and (6) which does not have any areas where all the hardware makers
price over MC.
Proposition 9 When a manufacturer chooses to make its software compatible with every other
hardware, every new entrant’s hardware price will be equal to the marginal cost. (Existence)
Proof:
Suppose that all the real numbers between 0 and 1 are occupied and every hardware maker
prices at MC. This situation clearly satisfies the necessary condition. In this situation, any
hardware maker does not have an incentive to move its location because all the places are occupied
already. In addition, if the other hardware makers price at MC, hardware maker i should price at
MC. Otherwise, it will lose its market to its neighbors. This case corresponds to case (3).
Suppose that all the real numbers between 0 and 1 are occupied and every hardware maker
prices at MC except one hardware maker, say the hardware maker at 12 . This hardware maker at
1
2 has zero market share because of its higher price. In this situation, the other hardware makers
do not want to move to the point 12 or raise their prices. The hardware maker at
1
2 does not want
to move or change its price, either. If it lowers its price to MC, it will get some market share
but its profits are still zero. This corresponds to case (6). Similar reasoning can be applied to the
situation where countably many hardware makers enter the market.
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